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Maintaining Partisan Ties: Preference Divergence and Partisan Collaboration in 
Western Europe 
 
Parties coordinate on a range of activities. They invite leaders from other parties to 
their national meetings, run joint electoral platforms and even form parliamentary 
factions and coalition governments. The implications of regular cooperation such as 
the case of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) for party positioning are unexplored. 
Parties form PECs to reduce competition for voters with ideologically close 
competitors and to signal their ability to cohesively govern. Building on this logic, we 
DUJXHWKDWSDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVFRQYHUJH in PECs to demonstrate their ability to 
govern together and diverge when parties observe that this tactic has failed to attract 
voter support in past elections. We demonstrate support for our approach using data 
on electoral coalition participationSDUW\SRVLWLRQVDQGSDUWLHV·LQWHUQDOVSHHFKHV
Additional evidence from an extreme case of an enduring electoral coalition in 
Germany shows that PECs KDYHGUDPDWLFHIIHFWVRQSDUWLHV·positions. 
Key words: Party coordination, pre-electoral coalitions, preferences, coalitions, sister 
parties 
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Party competition creates strange bedfellows because governance incentivizes 
cooperation between diverse groups. Parties coordinate their electoral and 
government formation strategies with their erstwhile competitors with tools such as 
pre-electoral agreements to maximize their potential for attracting votes and 
controlling government. Election rules often structure the shape and content of this 
coordination. Small and large parties in France, for example, often reach agreements 
to avoid direct competition for the same parliamentary seats and support one 
DQRWKHU·VFDQGLGDWHVRQWKHVHFRQGURXQGRIEDOORWV (e.g. Golder 2006; Spoon 2011). 
Despite knowledge of short term or irregular agreements between parties, less is 
known about the influence of regular participation in pre-electoral coalitions on 
larger SDUWLHV·LQWHUQDOSROLWLFV and policy positions. Why would ideologically distinct 
electoral competitors tie their future government success? Is it reasonable to treat 
parties as a single party-in-the-electorate and party-in-government, when each party 
acts organizationally separate?  
We propose an answer to these questions by considering PECs and SDUWLHV·
consequent electoral success. Our perspective builds on research focused on coalition 
and electoral coordination (Golder 2006; Ibenskas 2015a, Ibenskas 2015b) to account 
for varying levels of organizational, electoral and governmental cooperation. From 
this perspective, the effect of partisan cooperation on intra-party politics depends on 
the mode of coordination. Given their electoral motivations, parties in PECs that 
increase their parliamentary support respond by shifting their preferences closer 
together. When these coalitions fail to increase their electoral support, the parties 
involved seek to clarify their positions by distancing themselves.  
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We empirically explore this perspective with evidence on party positions from 
the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and PECs from Golder (2006). 
Specifically, we test if SDUWLHV·relative positions respond to experiences in PECs and 
if SDUWLHV·preferences move in tandem with those of their coalition partner. We show 
EURDGFRPSDUDWLYHHYLGHQFHWKDWSDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVVKLIWFORVHUto their PEC 
partners in response to electoral gains, but deviate when the coalitions no longer 
serve them in a sample of 20 countries from 1950-1998. The results are clearest for 
governing coalitions. Based on these results, we delve deeper into the process by 
examining an unlikely case for preference divergence: the long standing union 
between the German CDU and CSU. Despite distinct organizations, leaders, and 
even regional bases of support, the parties cooperate so closely that they are often 
treated as a single party by academics RUUHIHUUHGWRDV´VLVWHUSDUWLHVµLQWKHSRSXODU
press. These parties offer a challenging situation for party UHVHDUFKHUVDVWKHSDUWLHV·
distinct goals are usually combined in single, joint manifestos. These extreme 
examples of party collaboration provide unique evidence on the way that coalitions 
reconcile their diverse preferences. If these parties exhibit distinct goals, then this 
evidence would undermine claims for treating the party in electorate and party in 
government as unified.  
The results from our analysis hold important implications for theories of party 
competition in advanced democracies. Representation requires choice between 
ideological competitors. Collusion between parties limits citizen choice and confuses 
the clarity of policy responsibility (e.g. Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 
1999), but PECs might provide voters with choices that are more likely to control 
government. Evidence of a dynamic representation process would demonstrate the 
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means by which parties maintain their ties, yet actively promote the goals of their 
distinct constituencies.  
 
Partisan cooperation and competition 
 
 Although parties distinguish themselves in elections through their statements 
of preferences (e.g. Downs 1957; Adams 1999; Tavits 2007; Adams and Somer-Topcu 
2009; Ezrow et al. 2011; Spoon 2011), they also engage in a range of collaborative 
activities. While most research on election campaigns conceptualize parties as 
competitors, electoral rules, party system fractionalization and parliamentary 
governance incentivize cross-party collaboration. The existence of regular electoral 
alliances DQGVRFDOOHG´VLVWHUSDUWLHVµ mark the most extreme form of these 
collaborations. Despite the regularity of pre-electoral and governing coalitions as 
ZHOODVRWKHUIRUPVRIFRRUGLQDWLRQWKHHIIHFWRIFRRSHUDWLRQRQSDUWLHV·SROLF\
strategies and intra-party politics is understudied. Party definitions do not preclude 
cross-party coordination, yet the existence of cooperation suggests that parties see 
their electoral fortunes as tied to organizations which in other times might be their 
ideological competitors. Perspectives on party system change and election strategy 
offer some tools for understanding party coordination.  
More concrete forms of cooperation reflect ideologically proximate SDUWLHV· 
efforts to maximize their joint likelihood of entering government in response to 
electoral and government formation rules. In mixed electoral systems such as 
Germany (prior to the 2013 federal election) and New Zealand (after 1996), for 
example, smaller parties encourage their supporters to vote for ideologically close 
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larger parties on the majoritarian list and for themselves on the proportional list 
(Bawn 1999; Gschwend 2007). This split ticket voting increases the likelihood of an 
ideologically close post-election parliament by supporting parties that are more 
likely to gain a plurality of votes on the single member district while still 
FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHVPDOOHUSDUW\·VVHDWVKDUHWKURXJKWKHSURSRUWLRQDODOORFDWLRQRI
seats. 
Even in single member district elections, parties coordinate to increase the 
likelihood of winning an ideologically close majority in parliament. Parties on the 
ideological left in France agree to not directly compete against each other in select 
districts to avoid splitting their vote. In the second round ballot, parties then lend 
their support to the most ideologically close party (Golder 2006; Blais and Indridason 
2007; Spoon 2011).  
From an electoral standpoint, ideologically close parties competing for voters 
with similar preferences likely benefit from coordination. Direct competition among 
LGHRORJLFDOO\FORVHFRPSHWLWRUVOLNHO\VSOLWVERWKSDUWLHV·VXSSRUWHJ'RZQV
Furthermore, voters SHUFHLYHFRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV·SRVLWLRQVDVOHVVGLVWLQFWWKDQWKHLU
platforms would indicate (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Adams et al. 2015). Even 
LGHRORJLFDOO\GLVWDQWFRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUV·VWDWHPHQWVFDQOHJLWLPDWHFKDOOHQJHUSDUWLHV·
positions (Meguid 2005 and 2008). Candidates regularly pursue issues important to 
their electoral competitors upon entering office to avoid appearing weak on those 
policies (Sulkin 2005). Broadly, pHUFHSWLRQVRIRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV·FRPSHWHQFLHV
depend on evaluations of the government (Green and Jennings 2012). 
Upon entering government the incentives for parties to coalesce increases 
dramatically. Multi-party parliamentary systems motivate parties to negotiate lasting 
6 
 
bargains on a range of issues to create stable governments when there is no party 
with a parliamentary majority (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Müller and Strøm 1999). 
Minority governments necessitate coordination and cooperation with parties in 
parliament (e.g. Huber 1996). Coalitions incapable of supporting policy compromises 
lead governments to end prematurely (Warwick 1994; Martin and Vanberg 2011). 
While research has shown clear evidence of party coordination at the electoral 
and government levels, few studies WKHRUL]HRQKRZSDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHs relate. In 
contexts where parties regularly work together, it is unclear how PECs effect each 
FRPSRQHQWSDUW\·Vpolicy positions. Parties motivated to control government join 
PECs to reduce conflict for the same voters, reducing electoral inefficiencies, and thus 
increase the likelihood that the PEC will be able to form a government following the 
election. Further, parties might join PECs to demonstrate to voters their preferred 
governing coalition partners (Golder 2006; Ibenskas 2015a). This research is unclear, 
KRZHYHULISDUWLHV·HOHFWRUDOFRRUGLQDWLRQWKURXJK3(&VOHDGVSDUWLHVWRFRRUGLQDWH
their policy positions.  
 
Divided preferences and electoral coalitions 
 
PDUWLHV·UHYealed preferences through electoral campaigns represent their best 
effort to maximize votes while also representing internal groups (e.g. Harmel and 
Janda 1994). Past research on PECs shows that parties join them when they are 
electorally beneficial and increase the likelihood of forming a government post-
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election (Golder 2006).1 Parties are likely to join PECs when the benefits are relatively 
high and costs low; e.g. when ideological compromise is relatively easy (Ibenskas 
2015a). Presumably, in complex electoral environments, PECs reduce uncertainty 
about the post-election likelihood of governing coalitions (Tillman 2013). Given 
3(&·VHOHFWRUDOIRXQGDWLRQVDQGPRWLYDWLRQV SDUWLHV·OLNHO\HYDOXDWHsuccess based 
on their electoral consequences. SXFFHVVIXO3(&·VPLJKWHYHQUHVXOWLQSDUW\PHUJHUV
(e.g. Ibenskas 2015a) such as the eventual merger of the two largest Conservative 
parties in France as the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire from the Rassemblement 
Pour le République and the Union pour la Démocratie Française. In other extreme cases, 
sister parties such as the German Christian Democratic Party and the Christian Social 
Union manage real policy disagreements based on differences in their geographical 
constituencies, yet form PECs as a rule.  
Not all PECs result in such success or lasting relationships. Following electoral 
agreements for the 1997 elections in France, for example, Les Verts and the Parti 
Socialiste decided to go separate ways in the proceeding election. For these parties, 
HOHFWLRQVZLWK3(&·VOLNHO\PDUNDKLJKWLde in their political relations followed by 
the parties distancing themselves.  
5HVHDUFKRQ3(&VFRQWUDVWVVWXGLHVRQSDUWLHV·SRVLWLRning where parties that 
appear too ideologically close likely suffer electorally. Voters often perceive coalition 
SDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVDVFORVHUWRHDFKRWKHUWKDQWKHLUSODWIRUPVZRXOGSUHGLFW
(Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Adams et al. 2015). Indeed, government parties must 
                                                          
1 The incentives for parties to coordinate in these contexts are relatively strong for both sets of parties 
when they occur, as lack of coordination often leads to large electoral defeats. The electoral losses of 
the French Parti Socialiste in 2002 demonstrate that even larger parties suffer from the lack of 
coordination (e.g. Golder 2006).  
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emphasize issues more strongly for voters to perceive them (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 
2012; Greene 2015).  
In turn, party leaders seek to win elections by attracting distinct 
constituencies. These may be geographically separate as is the case for the CDU and 
the CSU in Germany, but also likely reflect slight differences in preferences or issue 
SULRULWLHV$SSHDULQJWRRFORVHZRXOGOLPLWWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRISDUWLHV·HOHFWLRQ
campaigns. The logic follows that, party leaders normally seek to draw clear lines 
between their preferences. We argue, however, that the conditions leading to PECs 
also introduce incentives to blur these lines.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
We argue that parties change their policy positions in response to coalition 
experiences. While governing coalitions are punished electorally for not sufficiently 
distinguishing their preferences (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012; Fortunato and 
Stevenson 2013; Adams et al. 2015; Greene 2015), PECs likely benefit from reducing 
ideological differences as these parties compete for ideologically similar voters. PECs 
reduce the number of ideologically similar competitors to increase the likelihood that 
those competitors can get into office and form a government. This logic implies that 
the very success of the PEC depends on an image of ideological cohesion. Voters 
ideologically closer to one of the parties (such as Les Verts in France) might take issue 
with a PEC including a party (such as the Parti Socialiste) that is farther from their 
preferred policies, unless the competitors reduce their differences. PECs also create 
the opportunity for the composite parties to foreshadow their combined governing 
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aspirations, reducing the uncertainty of the compromises a governing coalition 
would make. Both of these logics would indicate that parties would shift their 
preferences closer together as they enter a PEC. Therefore, we predict that parties 
entering a PEC likely move their manifesto positions towards each other in our first 
hypothesis.  
 
H1: Parties engaged in a PEC will decrease the distance between their 
manifesto positions. 
 
We propose that SDUWLHVLQ3(&VDUHDOVRUHVSRQVLYHWRWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VVXFFHVV
Parties that lost votes will see little reason to maintain their support for continued 
compromise. Distancing their position from that of their past partners likely offers 
the parties multiple advantages. For parties remaining in the coalition, greater 
GLVWDQFHOLNHO\H[SDQGVWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VLGHRORJLFDOEUHDGWKInstead, parties leaving a 
PEC can use the opportunity to distinguish their independent identities. The failure 
RIWKHSDVWHOHFWLRQOLNHO\GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VSRVLWLRQZDVQRWYLHZHG
as a credible government.  
This logic leads us to expect that parties shift positions in response to the 
electoral success of the PEC. PECs that increased their seat shares demonstrate that 
the coalition served its purpose. An electorally viable PEC reduces wasted votes for 
the two parties through coordination, essentially, mobilizing the inherent electoral 
system bias WRWKHWZRSDUWLHV·PXWXDOEHQHILW(e.g. Golder 2006; Ibenskas 2015a; 
Tillman 2015). Perceiving their future electoral success as connected, these parties 
will shift their positions even closer, to signal continued cooperation.  
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Less successful PECs face opposing incentives. PECs losing electoral support 
have failed to coordinate and PRELOL]HWKHHOHFWRUDOV\VWHP·VODUJHSDUW\ELDVLQWKHLU
favor. Parties in these PECs view future costs of collaboration as greater than the 
electoral benefits. This logic leads us to expect that parties in PECs that lose support 
in the last election will create distance between their positions to demonstrate 
distinct, credible identities. Altogether, we predict an inverse relationship between 
the past electoral success RID3(&DQGWKHSDUWLHV·SRVLWLRQV,QFUHDVHGVXSSRUWIRU
the PEC leads the parties to decrease their ideological differences, whereas decreased 
support leads parties to increase the distance between their stated preferences. 
 
H2: Parties engaged in an electorally (un)successful PEC will decrease 
(increase) the distance between their manifesto positions 
 
 In summary, we explain the relationship between electoral coordination and 
party preferences by considering the motives for entering a PEC. Parties indicate 
increased coordination by decreasing the distance between their preferences when 
they join a PEC. PDUWLHV·SRVLWLRQVLQFRQVHTXHQWHOHFWLRQVKRZHYHUGHSHQGRQWKH
electoral fortune of the PEC. Does the PEC mobilize the electoral system bias in the 
coDOLWLRQ·VIDYRU"3(&VEHQHILWLQJIURPFRRUGLQDWLRQGHFUHDVHGLIIHUHQFHVZKHUHDV
those coalitions failing to decrease electoral inefficiencies seek to distinguish their 
preferences. We next detail our approach to testing the hypotheses using a cross-
national test and a focused analysis of a difficult case. 
 
Data and methods 
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 We pursue two analyses to empirically examine our hypotheses. We first 
perform a large-N cross-national test of the hypotheses using data from the 
&RPSDUDWLYH0DQLIHVWRV3URMHFW&03DQG*ROGHU·VPEC data set. We then 
examine the internal validity of our analysis by examining a difficult or extreme case 
(e.g. George and Bennett 2005): the German Christian Democratic Union and the 
Christian Social Union. This research design allows us to be confident that our 
hypotheses are correct in that they not only hold for PECs in a broad range of 
settings, but also, that the inferences explain the relationship between parties 
engaged in long term electoral and governing commitments.2  
Our hypotheses focus on the relationship between parties. Therefore, we 
construct a dyadic dataset including every observation of a party in an election 
directed towards every other party in that election. This structure allows us to 
directly test our hypotheses using characteristics of the parties to predict the 
relationship between them.3 Following Lowe et al. (2011), we then measure 
ideological distance using the absolute difference between each party FRPELQDWLRQ·V 
logged left-right score based on the CMP·s RILE scale (Budge 2001; Klingemann et al. 
2006; Volkens et al. 2011). The dependent variable therefore ranges from 0 to just 
over 28 in our final sample.  
                                                          
2 Our research design also mirrors the logic of the nested analysis (Liebermann 2005) in which the 
researcher examines a case that fits well with the theory in the main analysis to determine how 
internally valid the theory is for these cases. Our case selection adds an additional level of challenge 
for the theory given the unusual nature of the case selected: the CDU and CSU do not have distinct 
manifestos in our main analysis and have engaged in a long term electoral and governing partnership. 
Given that these parties are often treated as a single party in most analyses, evidence that their 
preferences diverge and converge according to electoral results would indicate that our theory 
explains even these extreme cases.  
3 We use fixed effects to account for the lack of independence between the dyad pairs. For other 
research in comparative politics using similar data structures, see Van der Velden and Schumacher 
(2015) or Greene and Jensen (2014). 
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We operationalize our primary independent variable, participation in a pre-
HOHFWRUDOFRDOLWLRQXVLQJ*ROGHU·VGDWD7KHPHDVXUHLVHTXDOWRRQHLIWKH 
parties are jointly engaged in a PEC. Our analysis includes 139 dyads that form 
PECs.4  
:HH[DPLQHRXUVHFRQGK\SRWKHVLVXVLQJSDUWLHV·FKDQJHLQthe percentage 
seat share in the last election.5 We create a measure of the percentage seats controlled 
by the dyad and find the difference from the election at time, t-2, and time, t-1, to 
predict the manifesto distance at time, t. We include an interaction of change in seat 
share with whether the party was in a PEC in the last election to analyze our second 
hypothesis.  
We include control variables that likely moderate this relationship. In 
particular, we measure whether the parties were members of a governing coalition 
SULRUWRWKHHOHFWLRQXVLQJ*ROGHU·VFRDOLWLRQGDWDVHW)ROORZLQJ)RUWXQDWRDQG
Stevenson·V (2013) findings, we expect that parties in a governing coalition avoid 
appearing too ideological similar by increasing ideological distance. Furthermore, 
following the logic of Van der Velden and Schumacher (2015), we interact the main 
variables with a dummy variable indicating if the parties were in a governing 
coalition together. Presumably, the effect of PEC participation will be stronger in a 
governing context. We also account for the relative difference in seats controlled by 
each party; smaller parties likely distinguish their positions more clearly to avoid 
being subsumed by their larger partners. Fixed effects for the party and election year 
                                                          
4 See summary statistics in Table 1 in the Appendix.  
5 In the main analysis, we use the change in the natural log of the percentage seat share (+.5) to reduce 
the effect of outliers. The primary results are substantively similar using the untransformed data, but 
the main interaction is not significant in the simple models.  
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in each country account for additional unobserved heterogeneity, but limit our 
ability to include additional variables at these levels.  
Following the primary analysis, we extend the logic of the nested analysis to 
study an extreme case. Previous work on PECs (e.g. Golder 2006; Tillman 2013) 
removed cases of extreme, perpetual cooperation from analyses arguing that these 
parties should be seen as a single entity rather than as separate organizations. 
Existing measures of party positions using manifestos (e.g. CMP), experts (e.g. 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey) or public perceptions (e.g. CSES) also do not easily 
distinguish between parties with long-standing electoral agreements. If these past 
approaches are correct, then we should expect to see very little consistent variation in 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHV·SRVLWLRQV The regular treatment of parties such 
as the CDU and CSU in popular data sets and analyses demonstrates the general 
acceptance by researchers that there should be little difference between their 
positions or that these differences do not hold implications for behavior in 
government$QDO\VLVRIWKHVHSDUWLHV·SRVLWLRQVZRXOGWKHQRIIHUD´PRVWGLIILFXOWµ
RU´PRVWXQOLNHO\µFDVHIRUWKHWKHRU\DQGDOORZXVWRIXUWKHUH[DPLQHWKHORJLF of 
our hypotheses using more detailed data than available at the cross-national level 
(e.g. Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005). We therefore evaluate if the results 
from the primary analysis hold for parties with more extensive cooperation through 
a detailed case analysis of the German CDU and CSU using unique data on party 
positions derived from party leader speeches at parties·QDWLRQDOPHHWLQJV. We first 
begin with a cross-national analysis of party preferences and PECs. 
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Party positions, PECs, and election results 
 
To test our primary hypotheses in the cross-national sample, we use ordinary 
least squared regression with fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable to 
account for the dyadic data structure and the recurrence of dyads in multiple 
elections. We present the results of this analysis in Table 2 with multiple model 
specifications.  
<<<Table 2 Here>>> 
Our first hypothesis predicts that parties shift their preferences closer together 
when they join a PEC. As parties increase their coordination to reduce electoral 
inefficiencies and to put forward a common platform, they likely perceive benefits 
from decreasing their ideological distance. The results from Table 2 contradict this 
perspective. In particular, the coefficients for being a PEC prior to an election are 
positive in each of the models; however, the coefficients are far from statistically 
significant. The results suggest that electoral coordination does not concurrently lead 
to decreases in ideological differences between parties. The negative coefficient for 
the lagged dependent variable suggests that historically close parties might instead 
be more likely to join PECs. 
In contrast to the results for ongoing PECs, Table 2 presents greater support 
for our second hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that parties engaged in a PEC in 
the last election decrease their ideological distance when the coalition performed 
well, but increase their distance when the PEC performed poorly. Consistent with 
our second hypothesis, the coefficient for the interaction of being in a PEC in the last 
election and the change in seat shares in the last election are negative and statistically 
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significant at the 90 % level in the main PEC model and model including an 
interaction of cabinet participation and change in seat share. The full results offer 
further evidence of the theory, although suggesting the relationship is somewhat 
more complex. The three way interaction of PEC participation, change in seat share 
and cabinet membership is negative and statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. This result indicates that PECs in a government coalition that 
gained seats decrease their distance whereas those that lost seats become more 
distant. 
We present the effect of change in seat share for PECs based in Figure 1. In 
particular, we plot the predicted change in ideological distance (holding the control 
variables at their means and dichotomous variables at zero) over the range of change 
in parliamentary seat share. The first graph in Figure 1 demonstrates the negative 
effect of change in seat share conditional on being in a PEC based on the Main PEC 
Model whereas the second graph shows the conditional effect of change in seat share 
for PECs in government from the results in the Full Model. As hypothesized, a 
negative change in the percentage seats leads parties to increase their distance for 
both sets of models, whereas a positive change leads to reduced ideological conflict.6 
Indeed, the effect is substantively meaningful, as a change from one standard 
deviation below the mean level of seat share change to one standard deviation above 
the mean leads incumbent parties to increase their ideological distance by 1.47 (0.48, 
2.48).7 This is a change of approximately 4% of the dependent variable·VUDQJH. 
                                                          
6 A Wald test of the coefficients for change in seat share t-1, and its interactions with PECt-1 and Cabinet 
membership are jointly different from zero at the 99.9% level and different from the effect of change in 
seat share for non-cabinet parties at the 99% level.  
7 Confidence intervals are at the 95% level.  
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Altogether, the results suggest a clear relationship between electoral performance 
and ideological distance. 
<<<Figure 1 Here>>> 
The results for the control variables in Table 2 also largely fit with our 
expectations. In particular, parties in governing coalitions slightly decrease their 
distance, although the effect is not statistically different from zero in the simple 
cabinet model. In coalitions with greater variance in votes between parties in the last 
election, parties increase their distance, presumably to stake out more distinct 
positions.  
The results from our primary analysis indicate clear support for the contention 
that PECs respond to their past electoral success, particularly in government. These 
results suggest that the logic holds across a range of political contexts. But do these 
results hold for parties, which are so closely linked that they often form joint electoral 
manifestos? In the next section, we turn to the case of the CDU-CSU. We follow 
recent studies (Aylott and Bolin 2015; Somer-Topcu 2015) and focus particularly on 
WKHSRVLWLRQVRIWKHSDUWLHV·OHDGHUVKLSLQUHODWLRQWRWKHJHQHUDOSDUW\PHPEHUVKLS  
 
A brief history of the relationship between the CDU and CSU 
 
The story of the CDU and CSU coalition began at the conclusion of the Second 
World War. Following the collapse of the Nazi Regime in May 1945, multiple inter-
confessional Christian conservative parties independently formed across the 
occupied zones. The parties largely consisted of former members of the Centrist 
Party and conservative parties active during the Weimar Republic. By 1950, regional 
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associations in Bavaria coalesced to form the CSU while Christian parties in the rest 
of Germany united to form the CDU. Since then, the CSU has operated only within 
Bavaria, and the CDU has operated in all other states.  
The collaboration between both unions dates back to the first national election 
in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Following the election, members of 
parliament of the CDU and CSU joined forces to create a permanent parliamentary 
party. The CDU/CSU union was the largest faction of the first German Bundestag 
and formed a coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the national 
conservative German Party (DP). Since then, no Chancellor has ever come from the 
CSU. The two CSU candidates who ran for Chancellor, Franz Josef Strauß and 
Edmund Stoiber, were both defeated by the SPD in 1980 and 2002.  
Underlying the joint governing experience, the CDU and CSU have a long 
history of collaboration. They share a common youth organization and run a joint 
manifesto during federal elections. Yet, their relationship has not always been 
amicable. In 1976, for example, the parties nearly ended their parliamentary union, 
which is renewed after every federal election. Although the CDU-CSU won the 
election, they failed to replace the Social-Liberal coalition between the SPD and the 
FDP. Following the defeat, the CSU Bundestag faction decided to discontinue the 
agreement. The party eventually recalled the decision after the CDU made some 
concessions to the CSU and threatened to campaign in Bavaria. 
At several occasions, the CSU has also tried to increase its influence outside 
Bavaria. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the CSU supported the newly 
formed German Social Union (DSU) with financial resources and political know-how 
WRHVWDEOLVKD&68UHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQWKHVWDWHVRIWKHIRUPHU*'57KH&68·VQDWLRQDO
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congress in Leipzig in January 1990 was also the first time that a Western German 
party has held a big party meeting in Eastern Germany. In June 1990, 200 supporters 
of the CSU founded a regional association of the CSU in Saxony. 
Despite repeated tensions, observers describe the CDU and CSU as sister 
parties. As organizations, they function as entirely independent parties below the 
federal level with separate leaderships, decision-making bodies and distinct policy 
goals. As such, they frequently disagree on policy in their public statements and 
during electoral campaigns.  
<<<Figure 2 Here>>> 
 Notwithstanding their assumed coherence, the parliamentary factions also act 
with disunity. Figure 2 shows the level of discipline within the CDU-CSU faction 
when rolls were called during the 16th and 17th legislature of the German 
Bundestag. The black line shows the change of factional discipline over time, while 
the dashed and solid lines show the mean level of agreement and the break between 
the two legislative periods. The graph illustrates that the level of unity within the 
CDU-CSU varies over time and was lower, and generally much more volatile, during 
the grand coalition with the SPD from 2005 to 2009 than during the liberal-
conservative government with the FDP from 2009 onwards. This disagreement likely 
IROORZVIURPWKH63'·Vfocus on policies highlighting distinctions between the 
parties. 
<<<Figure 3 Here>> 
Differences evidence themselves not only at the abstract governmental level. 
The public also observes disunity. Figure 3 shows public perceptions of divisions 
between the two parties over time using annual measures from the Politbarometer 
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survey. Since Angela Merkel took over the leadership of the CDU in 2000, voter 
perceptions of disagreement between the CDU and the CSU increased by nearly 30 
percent. By 2005, two-third of the respondents thought that the Union was internally 
divided. This number decreased when the two parties entered government in 
October 2005 only to increase again in the run up to the 2009 election.  
The history of collaboration and confrontation between the CDU and CSU 
suggests that their shared government performance occurs despite organizational 
differences. As these examples further illustrate, divisions between the CDU and 
CSU are frequent, although scholars treat them as a single organizations in a range of 
analyses. In the next section, we introduce a new dataset that we use to examine the 
SDUWLHV·previously unmeasured preferences.  
 
Using party congress speeches to extract party positions 
 
To further explore the relationship between the CDU and CSU, we collect a 
new dataset of party leader and member speeches over a twenty year period that 
DOORZVXVWRHVWLPDWHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHSDUWLHV·SRVLWLRQVLQWKHDEVHQFHRIGLVWLQFW
party manifestos,QSDUWLFXODUZHHVWLPDWHWKHSDUWLHV·UHYHDOHGSUHIHrences at these 
PHHWLQJVE\DQDO\]LQJVSHHFKHVJLYHQDWWKHSDUWLHV·QDWLRQDOFRQIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ
1990 and 2011. Party congresses in these parties are usually held once a year and 
offer delegates a relatively unconstrained platform to voice their opinions.8  
Following recent advancements in automated text analysis, we use 
WORDFISH (Slapin and Proksch 2008) to retrieve the relative position of speeches on 
                                                          
8 :HFROOHFWHGWKHRULJLQDOWUDQVFULSWVIURPWKHSDUWLHV·ZHEVLWHVDQGWKHGDWDDUFKLYHVRIWKH.RQUDG
Adenauer Foundation and the Hans Seidel Foundation.  
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the primary dimension of conflict. The WORDFISH algorithm uses the frequency of 
word usage to estimate word and document coefficients according to a Poisson 
distribution. The model then uses these estimates to group documents according to 
their most common word usage.  
WHHVWLPDWHRQHPRGHOIRUDOOVSHHFKHVWRFDOFXODWHWKHDFWRUV·
preferences at each meeting on a principle left-right dimension. Based on this model, 
Figure 4 plots the yearly median position of the CDU (black square) and the CSU 
(grey square), the point estimates of the respective leaders from both parties, and a 
mean position across all congresses (dashed line).9 At this point, CSU speeches 
following 1999 are publically unavailable. As an alternate source of evidence, 
however, the CDU frequently invites CSU leaders to speak at their congresses. We 
XVHWKH&68OHDGHUV·SRVLWLRQDWWKHVHPHetings as a proxy for the party median 
following 1999.  
 
Public opinion and the distance between party leaders 
 
Our discussion implies differences between the CDU and the CSU, despite 
continued electoral collaboration. Our second hypothesis predicts that parties will 
move apart following electoral loss and together in response to electoral gains. This 
prediction contrasts one in which each party reacts in tandem to some external factor 
such as public opinion LQWKH¶ULGLQJWKHZDYH·K\SRWKHVLVHJ6SRRQDQG.OYHU
2014).  
<<<Figure 4 Here>>> 
                                                          
9 We mark years holding more than one congress with an underscore. 
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We present evidence to support our approach in Figure 4 and Table 3. Figure 4 
illustrates that both parties and their leaders have changed their positions based on 
their speeches DWSDUWLHV·QDWLRQDOPHHWLQJVRYHUWLPH Most noticeably, the plot 
exhibits a clear leftward trend in the position estimates, especially for the median 
poVLWLRQRIWKH&68FRQJUHVVDQGWKHSDUW\OHDGHUV·SRVLWLRQ and following a change 
in leadership (Somer-Topcu 2015)7KHJUDSKDOVRVKRZVWKDWWKHSDUW\OHDGHUV·
positions frequently diverge from the party median (consistent with Ceron 2013; 
Greene and Haber 2014; Kölln and Polk 2015). 
These results suggest that the parties and their leaders have distinct positions 
which vary over time. An intriguing development is that shifts in the CSU party 
leader position at time t+1 often shift in opposition to shifts from the CDU at time t. 
7KH&68SDUW\OHDGHU·VSRVLWLRQLQDQGIRUH[DPSOHVKLIWVPRUHWR
the right from their past position following shifts towards the left from the CDU 
party leader in previous years. More broadly, the CDU party leadership positions 
stake a relatively consistent leftward trend, whereas the CSU party leaders 
demonstrate a slightly more varied pattern, perhaps reflecting the relative size 
disparity. 
To determine whether the positions of both parties change in tandem we 
estimated the change in position for party leaders over time. Figure 5 shows the 
change in positions of the CDU (solid line) and CSU (dashed line) leaders from 1990 
to 2011. The shaded areas indicate the government status while the dashed lines 
represent general elections.  
<<<Figure 5 Here>>> 
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The two time series show a number of interesting patterns. The difference 
between party leader positions of both parties decreased over time. This might 
indicate that the CSU/CSU have become more ideologically similar in government. 
Second, as our hypothesis might predict, the time series suggests that both parties 
changed positions in opposing directions prior to the general election in 1998. From 
their time in opposition, however, until the end of their coalition with the FDP in 
2009, the CDU and CSU changed positions more in tandem.  
,QWULJXLQJO\WKHOHDGHUV·SRVLtions have more recently diverged. These 
GLIIHUHQFHVDUHGULYHQODUJHO\E\0HUNHO·VPRYHWRZDUGVWKHOHIW7KLVPLJKWLPSO\
that the parties could be in for a leadership dispute (unsupported by the 
PHPEHUVKLS·VSRVLWLRQV).  
<<<Figure 6 Here>>> 
Without extensive time series analysis it is difficult to draw conclusions about 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWHUPVRIWKHVL]HDQGWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKHWZRSDUWLHV·FKDQJHVLQ
positions. Nevertheless, we can test what effect changes in public opinion have on 
the distance between the party leaders with the data available. We measure public 
opinion using the monthly voter polls from the Politbarometer dataset. The data are 
based on a public opinion survey that asks respondents which party they would vote 
for if there was an election on Sunday. Figure 6 shows the relationship between polls, 
aggregated to yearly averages, and the distance between the party leaders between 
1991 and 2011. We predict the effect of public opinion on distance using a simple, 
bivariate linear regression model with party leader distance as the dependent and the 
poll from the year prior to a party congress as the independent variable. Consistent 
with our second hypothesis and our cross-national analyses, the distance between 
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the party leaders decreases when their polls in the previous year are higher. The 
result is significant at the 95 percent level but should be interpreted with caution due 
to our small sample.10  
 
Conclusions 
 
We have argued that the relationship between party cooperation and party 
positions is more complex than traditional descriptions take into account. Using 
evidence on PECs and party positions as well as a case study of two historically close 
parties, the German CDU and CSU, we find that the electoral success of a PEC 
SUHGLFWVWKHSDUWLHV·IXWXUHGLIIHUHQFHLQSUHIHUHQFHV. The logic of electoral 
competition suggests ideologically close parties distinguish their preferences in the 
face of electoral losses, but they shift closer when the PEC has increased its support. 
These results imply that parties engaged in PECs act more consistent with traditional 
theories of party positioning when they face electoral losses (e.g. Adams 1999; 
Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Spoon 2011). Like van der Velden and Schumacher 
(2015), our results indicate that coalitions use their electoral success to determine 
their future positions. Unlike other forms of governing coalitions though (e.g. 
Fortunato and Stevenson 2013), PECs do not further distinguish their preferences 
when they increase their votes in the last election. Analysis of party manifestos from 
a broad cross-sectional time series and speeches from party national congresses in 
Germany support our hypotheses. 
                                                          
10 Reversing the correlation by using a one-year lag of party distances to predict public opinion yields 
only a weak positive correlation (0.06).  
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This evidence invokes a number of directions for future research on PECs. 
Indeed, it is possible that the conditions leading to the past electoral success of PECs 
DOVRUHODWHWR3(&V·LGHRORJLFDOSUR[LPLW\:HDFFRXQWIRUSDUWLHV·SDVWSRVLWLRQVDQG
success, but the relationship is likely more nuanced. Further, competing logics 
suggesWWKDWWKHUHODWLYHLGHRORJLFDOFORVHQHVVRI3(&·VPLJKWLQIOXHQFHWKHLUIXWXUH
HOHFWRUDOVXFFHVVDVPRUHGLYHUVH3(&·VDWWUDFWDEURDGHUUDQJHRIVXSSRUWHJ
Somer-7RSFXRUXQLILHG3(&·VLQGLFDWHDPRUHUHVSRQVLEOHDQGQHJRWLDWHG
governing coalition.11  
The results from this analysis hold clear implications for the study of party 
politics. Researchers often treat sister parties as if they are a single party. Common 
data sets, such as the Comparative Manifestos Project only include a single manifesto 
for the German CDU and CSU in most elections. Our analysis suggests that studies 
not fully taking account of the complex relationship between these two 
organizationally distinct, but regular collaborators might arrive at unexpected 
results. Furthermore, PECs likely influence how party leaders manage intra-party 
factions and likely introduce the incentives for greater preference incongruence 
between party leaders and members (see also Greene and Haber 2014; Ceron 2015; 
Kölln and Polk 2015; Somer-Topcu 2015). 
The relationships between parties likely hold important consequences for 
political representation. Classic formulations of the linkages between citizens and 
party government require that citizens have clear parties to choose between. Pre-
electoral coalitions and sister parties confuse that linkage by letting parties appear 
ideologically closer to each other, but also reduce the choices available to increase the 
                                                          
11 We would like to thank one of our anonymous reviewers for detailing these competing implications.  
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chance that either they will control government(YLGHQFHRISDUWLHV·HIIRUWVZLth 
slightly varying preferences to collectively manage their separate constituencies 
indicates that the representation process is both more complex than often envisioned, 
but also still responsive to various constituency demands. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
 Mean St.Dev. Min Max N 
DV: Distance 2.991 4.108 0 28.16 2860 
PEC 0.0524 0.223 0 1 2860 
PECt-1 0.0521 0.222 0 1 2860 
Ʀ3(&6HDWV -0.0006 0.09 -0.815 0.634 2860 
Government Coalition 0.532 0.499 0 1 2860 
Seat Difference 14.41 12.14 0 51.06 2678 
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Table 2. OLS Estimates of PEC Ideological Distance with Fixed Effects for Dyad year. 
 Simple Main PEC Incumbent Full 
PEC 0.239 0.226 0.224 0.239 
 (0.368) (0.364) (0.361) (0.357) 
PECt-1 -0.728
* -0.691+ -0.678+ -0.540 
 (0.358) (0.353) (0.359) (0.403) 
PECt-1 ;ǻ6HDWV  -3.405+ -3.429+ 0.357 
  (1.959) (1.931) (2.436) 
ǻ6HDWV -0.402 -0.069 0.828 0.510 
 (0.606) (0.667) (0.976) (1.009) 
Seat Differencet-1 2.138
* 2.064* 2.018* 2.061* 
 (0.872) (0.862) (0.856) (0.833) 
Cabinet -0.078 -0.082 -0.083 -0.068 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.151) 
&DELQHW;ǻ
Seats 
  -1.702 -1.125 
   (1.329) (1.380) 
Cabinet X PEC t-1    -0.262 
    (0.468) 
Cabinet X PEC t-1 
X ǻ % Seats 
   -7.420* 
    (3.093) 
DVt-1 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Constant 1.570*** 1.582*** 1.609*** 1.547*** 
 (0.316) (0.313) (0.313) (0.310) 
AIC 13552.697 13552.427 13552.522 13553.515 
BIC 14523.945 14529.633 14535.687 14548.597 
RMSE 2.557 2.556 2.556 2.556 
Log-Likelihood -6613.349 -6612.213 -6611.261 -6609.757 
Observations 2860 2860 2860 2860 
Regression results are from a fixed effect OLS with a lagged dependent variable. 
Fixed effects are constructed for the party dyad and the election. Robust standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed:  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 1. Predicted Effect of Change in Seat Share.12 
  
 
Figure 2. Factional Discipline within the CDU/CSU faction.13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Figure 1 presents the median predicted effect of increasing the change in percentage seat shares for 
parties engaged in a PEC in the last election over the observed range of seat share change for parties in 
PECs based on the Main and Full models in Table 2. We present 90% confidence intervals for the Main 
Model and 95% confidence intervals for the Full Model. The confidence intervals are from 1000 draws 
of the variance-covariance matrix. Dashes at the bottom present the observed seat share change for 
opposition (smaller marks) and incumbent (larger, darker marks) PECs. 
13 The level of cohesion of the CDU-CSU faction is based on an analysis of all rolls called in the 16th 
and 17th German Bundestag. The values on the y axis show the percentage of MPs that voted with the 
faction majority. 
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Figure 3. Perceived Level of Internal Divisions within the CDU/CSU. 14
 
 
Figure 4. Relative Party Congress and Party Leader Positions, 1990-2011.15 
 
                                                          
14 The data presented in Figure 3 are based on a survey question that asks respondents to indicate if 
they think that the CDU and CSU are rather divided or rather united on key political issues.  
15 Figure 4 shows the change in positions of the CDU and CSU party congresses (black and grey 
squares) and their respective leaders (black and grey stars with names) over time. The position 
estimates DUHJHQHUDWHGIURPSDUW\PHPEHUVSHHFKHVJLYHQDWWKHSDUWLHV·QDWLRQDOFRQJUHVVHVXVLQJ
the scaling technique Wordfish. We pool all available speeches into a single text matrix and thereby 
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Figure 5. Mean positions of party leaders, 1990 ² 2011.16 
 
Figure 6. Expected vote share and distance between party leaders. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
DVVXPHWKDWZHHVWLPDWHWKHDFWRUV·SRVLWLRQVRQDJHQHUDOOHIW-right scale. The CSU party congresses 
from 2000 onwards are generated from speeches given by the CSU leader at the CDU conventions.  
16 The positions of the party leaders are the same Wordfish estimates introduced in Figure 4.  
31 
 
Bibliography 
Aylott, Nicholas, and Niklas Bolin. 2015. ´Managed intra-party democracy: 
Precursory delegation and party leader selection.µ Paper presented at the 
Gothenburg Workshop on Intra- Party Politics, 17- 18 September 2015. 
 
Adams, James, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. ´0RGHUDWH1RZ:LQ9RWHV/DWHU
7KH(OHFWRUDO&RQVHTXHQFHVRI3DUWLHV·3ROLF\6KLIWVLQ3RVWZDU
'HPRFUDFLHVµThe Journal of Politics 71(02): 678²92. 
 
$GDPV-DPHV/DZUHQFH(]URZ&KULVWRSKHU:OH]LHQ´7KH&RPSDQ\\RX
keep: How Voters Infer Party Positions on European Integration from 
*RYHUQLQJ&RDOLWLRQ$UUDQJHPHQWVµAmerican Journal of Political Science. 
 
$GDPV-DPHV´3ROLF\'LYHUJHQFHLQ0XOWLFDQGLGDWH3UREDELOLVWLF6SDWLDO
9RWLQJµPublic Choice 100(1-2): 103²22. 
 
Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller. 2014. "Who takes the parliamentary 
floor? The role of gender in speech-making in the Swedish Riksdag." Political 
Research Quarterly. 
 
Bäck, Hanna. 2008. "Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Formation Evidence from 
Swedish Local Government." Party Politics 14 (1): 71-89. 
 
Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. "Voter responses to electoral complexity: Ticket splitting, 
rational voters and representation in the Federal Republic of Germany." British 
Journal of Political Science 29 (3): 487-505. 
 
Bawn, Kathleen, and Zeynep SomerǦTopcu. 2012. "Government versus opposition at 
the polls: How governing status affects the impact of policy positions." 
American Journal of Political Science 56 (2): 433-446. 
 
Blais, André, and Indridi Indridason. 2007. "Making candidates count: the logic of 
electoral alliances in twoǦround legislative elections." Journal of Politics 69 (1): 
193-205. 
 
Budge, Ian. 2001. Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and 
governments, 1945-1998. Oxford University Press. 
 
Carey, John, DQG0DWWKHZ6KXJDUW´,QFHQWLYHVWRFXOWLYDWHDSHUVRQDOYRWHD
UDQNRUGHULQJRIHOHFWRUDOIRUPXODVµElectoral Studies 14 (4): 417²439. 
 
&HURQ$QGUHD´%UDYHUHEHOVVWD\KRPH$VVHVVLQJWKHHIIHFWRILQWUD-party 
ideological heterogeneity and party whip on roll-FDOOYRWHVµParty Politics 24: 
1²13. 
 
32 
 
&HURQ$QGUHD´Intra-party politics in 140 characters. To what extent social 
media analysis provides information on intra-party dynamics? Three 
applications to the Italian caseµPaper presented at the Gothenburg Workshop on 
Intra- Party Politics, 17- 18 September 2015. 
 
Cox, Gary. 1999. "Electoral rules and electoral coordination." Annual Review of Political 
Science 2 (1): 145-161. 
 
'RZQV$QWKRQ\´$Q(FRQRPLF7KHRU\RI'HPRFUDF\µ 
 
Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz, and Wolfgang Müller. 2013. "Intra-party democracy, 
political performance and the survival of party leaders Austria, 1945²2011." 
Party Politics. 
 
Ezrow, Lawrence, Catherine De Vries, Marco Steenbergen, and Erica Edwards. 2011. 
´0HDQ9RWHU5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDQG3DUWLVDQ&RQVWLWXHQF\5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ'R
3DUWLHV5HVSRQGWRWKH0HDQ9RWHU3RVLWLRQRUWR7KHLU6XSSRUWHUV"µParty 
Politics 17(3): 275²301. 
 
Fortunato, David, and Randolph Stevenson. 2013. "Perceptions of partisan ideologies: 
The effect of coalition participation." American Journal of Political Science 57 (2): 
459-477. 
 
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case studies and theory development in 
the social sciences. MIT Press. 
 
Gerring-RKQ´:KDWLVDFDVHVWXG\DQGZKDWLVLWJRRGIRU"µAmerican Political 
Science Review 98(2): 341²354. 
 
*ROGHU6RQD1´3UH-electoral coalition formation in parliamentary 
GHPRFUDFLHVµBritish Journal of Political Science 36 (2): 193-212. 
 
*UHHQ-DQHDQG:LOO-HQQLQJV´7KHG\QDPLFVRILVVXHFRPSHWHQFHDQGYRWHIRU
parties in and out of power: An analysis of valence in Britain, 1979-µ
European Journal of Political Research 51 (4): 469²503. 
 
Greene, Zachary and Christian Jensen. 2016. "Manifestos, salience and junior 
ministerial appointments." Party Politics 22 (3): 382-392. 
 
*UHHQH=DFKDU\DQG0DWWKLDV+DEHU´/HDGHUVKLS&RPSHWLWLRQDQG
'LVDJUHHPHQWDW3DUW\1DWLRQDO&RQJUHVVHVµBritish Journal of Political Science 
FirstView: 1²22. 
 
Greene, Zachary. 2015 "Competing on the issues: How experience in government and 
HFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVLQIOXHQFHWKHVFRSHRISDUWLHV·SROLF\PHVVDJHVParty 
Politics OnlineFirst: 1-14. 
 
33 
 
Gschwend, Thomas. 2007. "TicketǦsplitting and strategic voting under mixed 
electoral rules: Evidence from Germany." European Journal of Political Research 
46 (1): 1-23. 
 
Huber, John. 1996. Rationalizing parliament: legislative institutions and party politics in 
France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ibenskas, Raimondas. 2015a´8QGHUVWDQGLQJ3UH-electoral Coalitions in Central and 
(DVWHUQ(XURSHµBritish Journal of Political Science FirstView: 1²19. 
 
Ibenskas, Raimondas. 2015b´Patterns of Party Change in Central and Eastern 
Europe, 1990-2015µPaper presented at the Gothenburg Workshop on Intra- Party 
Politics, 17- 18 September 2015. 
 
Kölln, Ann Kristin and Jonathan Polk. 2015. ´Emancipated Members: Examining 
Ideological Incongruence within Political Parties.´Paper presented at the 
Gothenburg Workshop on Intra- Party Politics, 17- 18 September 2015. 
 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, et al. 2006. 2 
Mapping policy preferences II: estimates for parties, electors, and governments in 
Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003. Oxford University Press 
Oxford.  
 
/DYHU0LFKDHO´'LYLGHGSDUWLHVGLYLGHGJRYHUQPHQWµLegislative Studies 
Quarterly 2 (1): 5²29. 
 
Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. Making and breaking governments: 
Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
/LHEHUPDQ(YDQ´1HVWHGDQDO\VLVDVDPL[HG-method strategy for comparative 
UHVHDUFKµAmerican Political Science Review 99(03): 435²452. 
 
Lowe, Will, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikha\ORYDQG0LFKDHO/DYHU´6FDOLQJ
SROLF\SUHIHUHQFHVIURPFRGHGSROLWLFDOWH[WVµLegislative Studies Quarterly 
36(1): 123²155. 
 
Martin, Lanny, and Georg Vanberg. 2011. Parliaments and coalitions: The role of 
legislative institutions in multiparty governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Meguid, Bonnie´&RPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQXQHTXDOV7KHUROHRIPDLQVWUHDP
SDUW\VWUDWHJ\LQQLFKHSDUW\VXFFHVVµAmerican Political Science Review 99 (3): 
347²359. 
 
Meguid, Bonnie. 2008. Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral 
Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
34 
 
Müller, Wolfgang, and Kaare Strøm. 1999. Policy, office, or votes?: how political parties in 
Western Europe make hard decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Powell Jr, G. Bingham, and Guy Whitten. 1993."A cross-national analysis of economic 
voting: taking account of the political context." American Journal of Political 
Science: 391-414. 
 
Slapin, Jonathan, and SvenǦOliver Proksch. 2008. "A scaling model for estimating 
timeǦseries party positions from texts." American Journal of Political Science 52 
(3): 705-722. 
 
Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2015. "7KH(IIHFWVRI1HZ3DUW\/HDGHUVRQ9RWHUV·
Perceptions of Party Positions." Working Paper. 
 
Spoon, Jae--DHDQG+HLNH.OYHU´'RSDUWLHVUHVSRQG"+RZHOHFWRUDOFRQWH[W
LQIOXHQFHVSDUW\UHVSRQVLYHQHVVµElectoral Studies 35: 48²60. 
 
Spoon, Jae-Jae. 2011. Political survival of small parties in Europe. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
 
Sulkin, Tracy. 2005. Issue Politics in Congress. Cambridge University Press. 
 
7DYLWV0DUJLW´3ULQFLSOHYVSUDJPDWLVPSROLF\VKLIWVDQGSROLWLFDO
FRPSHWLWLRQµAmerican Journal of Political Science 51(1): 151²165. 
 
Tillman, Erik. 2013. "Pre-electoral coalitions and voter turnout." Party Politics: 
1354068813499868. 
 
Van der Velden, Mariken. and Gijs Schumacher. ´'R&RDOLWLRQ3DUWQHUV'ULIW
Apart or Stick Together? An Analysis of Party Platform Changes in 11 
Western European Countries. Presented at the Annual Conference of the 
Midwest Political Science Association (April 2015): Chicago, IL.  
 
9RONHQV$QGUHDHWDO´7KHPDQLIHVWRGDWDFROOHFWLRQµManifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 
(WZB). 
 
Warwick, Paul. 1994. Government survival in parliamentary democracies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Whitten, Guy, and Harvey Palmer. 1999. "Cross-national analyses of economic 
voting." Electoral Studies 18.1: 49-67. 
